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ABSTRACT 
 
Employing data on the immigrant stocks of 43 African home countries who reside in 110 host 
countries and on trade flows between these countries during the year 2005, we examine whether 
African immigrants exert positive effects on their home countries’ trade with the typical host 
country. Estimates from Tobit regression models indicate a one percent increase in the number of 
African immigrants in a given host country increases that country’s exports to and imports from the 
typical home country by 0.132 percent and 0.259 percent, respectively. Further evaluation of these 
effects from the perspective of each African home country reveals that, in several instances, 
immigrants do not exert positive and significant influences on trade flows. The considerable 
variation in the presence of pro-trade influences and the dissimilarity of estimated significant 
effects suggests that highly divergent immigration and trade structures among African countries 
may affect whether African immigrants exert pro-trade influences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
International migration has resulted in a considerable loss of human capital for many 
African nations. Marfouk (2006) estimates that, due to migration, 10 of the 53 African 
nations have lost at least 35 percent of their tertiary level-educated labor force. In many 
countries – specifically, Cape Verde (68%), Gambia (63%), Seychelles (56%), Mauritius 
(56%) and Sierra Leone (53%) – the loss has been quite severe. Based on this and other 
information, Akokpari (2006) argues that international migration generally has had 
adverse effects for African nations. Consequently, it is unsurprising that policymakers in 
many African countries are concerned with what are often described as potentially 
catastrophic consequences of increased emigration. Even so, emigration may have 
positive effects on both aggregate income levels and the growth rates of income for many 
emigrant source countries. For example, a recent cross-country analysis of the effect of 
emigration on poverty by Cattaneo (2009) concludes that, ceteris paribus, a 10 percent 
increase in the per capita stock of migrants in OECD nations augments the incomes of the 
poor in their source countries by an average of one percent. Given that international 
migrants have also been found to increase the trade and/or foreign direct investment 
flows between their host and home countries, migrants may confer positive effects on 
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economic growth and, hence, the economic development of both their host and home 
nations (Murat and Pistoresi, 2009). 
While numerous studies have examined the effects of immigrants on trade, 
owing to the extensive availability of immigrant stock data for relatively more developed 
host countries and the intense public interest in the immigration policies of these 
countries, prior studies have largely focused on the potential effects of immigrants on 
trade between developed host countries and their immigrants’ home countries. Although 
this emphasis on developed host countries has produced a deeper understanding of the 
immigrant-trade relationship, the lack of home country-specific data on emigrant stocks 
has resulted in little attention being given to the implications of the relationship for 
developing home countries. As Docquier (2007) notes, while the flow of immigrants, 
particularly those that are highly skilled, from developing home countries to developed 
host countries is quite large, considerable numbers of people also migrate from one 
developing country to another. Parsons et al., (2007), for example, reports that as much as 
one quarter of the world’s international migration flow occurs between developing 
countries. According to Parsons et al., (2007), African countries supply as much as eight 
percent of the stock of immigrants in Western Europe, and several African countries 
serve as hosts to millions of immigrants from within the region. Even so, Africa’s intra- 
and inter-regional trade flows are markedly less intensive as compared to flows observed 
elsewhere. Moreover, little information exists about the influences that immigrants from 
and within African countries exert on trade between their host and home countries. This 
paper fills this void by examining whether African immigrants affect their respective 
home nations’ trade with their host nations and, if so, by determining the extent to which 
the effect varies across the home countries in Africa. 
Our study offers several important contributions. First, we extend the related 
literature by specifically examining the effects of immigrants from African countries on 
host-home country trade flows. Second, by focusing on the potential impacts of 
immigrants on trade between various hosts and their African home countries, we enhance 
our knowledge of the immigrant-trade link as it relates to developing home countries that 
are less open to international trade as compared to other host/home countries for which 
the link has been widely examined. Third, by comparing the amount of trade generated 
by a typical immigrant across our cohort of African home countries, we highlight the role 
that the heterogeneity of trade and immigration structures among African countries may 
play in affecting the ability of immigrants to influence host-home country trade flows 
and, thus, their abilities to contribute to their home nations’ economic growth. Finally, 
our results provide insights that may be useful for the formulation of economic and social 
policies relating to goods markets and factor markets in developing countries. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section II, we review the related literature. 
Section III presents our empirical specification, details the data and explanatory variables 
included in the analysis, and discusses our a priori expectations regarding the signs of the 
respective coefficients. Estimation results are discussed in Section IV, while Section V 
concludes. 
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REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Beginning with Gould (1994), who used US data to first analyze the immigrant-trade 
link, a voluminous literature documents a similar link for many developed/high income 
host countries and for a few upper-middle income host countries. The literature, which is 
reviewed thoroughly in Poot and Strutt (2011), White and Tadesse (2011) and White 
(2010), generally indicates that immigrants increase their host country’s imports from 
their respective home nations due to biases in their tastes and preferences for home 
country-produced goods. In addition, international trade often involves interactions 
between parties that reside in countries that differ in their cultures, laws and institutions. 
These differences may hinder the initiation and completion of trade deals, and, if so, 
reduce the likelihood that trade takes place and/or the volume of transactions. Essentially, 
immigrants may increase trade between their home and host nations by narrowing 
communication gaps and, hence, lowering trade-related search costs. In addition, as 
immigrants often have connections to social and business networks they may also provide 
a contract enforcement mechanism that facilitates both the initiation and the completion 
of trade deals. Supporting this notion, a World Bank (2006) study asserts that by creating 
well-connected Diasporas, the migration of highly-skilled people, in particular, increases 
trade flows if immigrants act as intermediaries that expand cooperation and enable the 
enforcement of contracts.  
As noted, pro-trade immigrant influences have been reported for a large number 
of developed host countries: Some examples include White and Tadesse (2007) for 
Australia, Head and Ries (1998) for Canada, White (2007b) for Denmark, Bryant et al. 
(2004) for New Zealand, Blanes (2003) for Spain, and Girma and Yu (2002) for the UK. 
Based on studies involving upper-middle income host countries, Bacarreza et al. (2006) 
for Bolivia, Piperakis et al. (2003) for Greece, and Hong and Santhapparaj (2006) for 
Malaysia also report positive influences of immigrants on the observed host nations’ 
trade with their respective home nations. Examining several other host countries’ trade 
with numerous home countries, including many from Africa, the most recent literature 
also offers further evidence of the positive influences of immigrants on trade. Some 
examples are in order as they provide important insights that motivate our study.  
Using data for a highly heterogeneous sample of 189 home countries, Bratti et 
al. (2011) examine the influence of immigrants on trade between their home countries 
and individual provinces in Italy during the 2003-2009 period. Employing province-level 
data allows the authors to examine the immigrant-trade link at the lowest level of the host 
country’s geographical and administrative units (both in terms of immigration and 
international trade). Bratti et al. report that while an increase in the immigrant stock 
corresponds with substantial increases in the typical province’s exports to the immigrants' 
home countries, an even larger effect is observed on province-level imports from the 
immigrants’ home countries. In addition to the usual explanations in the literature – 
namely, that immigrants foster bilateral trade due to their superior knowledge of market 
opportunities in their home countries and as a result of biases in their tastes and 
preferences for home country produced goods – the authors attribute the pro-trade effects 
of immigrants, in part, to higher numbers of host country firms being owned by foreign-
born entrepreneurs.   
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While migration has been associated with higher levels of trade, which is often 
interpreted as evidence for migrants’ ability to lower trade-related costs, the literature has 
largely failed to provide evidence on the roles that migrants may play in lowering firms’ 
trade-related costs and on the mechanisms through which the impact is derived. 
Hatzigeorgiou and Lodefalk (2011) examine unique employer-employee data for 12,000 
Swedish firms for the period 1998-2007 and provide the first in-depth study of the impact 
of immigrants on firm-level trade. Results obtained from the estimation of a gravity 
model demonstrate the presence of a significant, positive, and robust impact of 
immigrants on firm-level trade (imports as well as exports). Further, the authors report 
that immigrants increase firm-level trade at both the extensive and intensive product 
margins. The observed robust effects are attributed to the abilities of immigrants to lower 
firms’ trade-related costs through the provision of information and via the buildup of trust 
channels that reduce frictions and, thus, facilitate trade with their countries of birth. 
Mundra (2010) examines the influence of immigrant networks on US trade, 
particularly through the demand effect, using trade and immigrant stock data for 63 major 
trading partners and immigrant source countries during the 1991-2000 period. First, 
employing a standard Heckscher-Ohlin framework to examine immigrants’ trade effects 
when they consume more of the goods that are abundant in their home countries than do 
the native-born, the author finds the trade effect to be, a priori, indeterminate. Second, 
based on results obtained from estimation of the gravity model, the author reports that 
while immigrants’ income, mostly through a demand effect, has a negative effect on US 
imports, when immigrants’ income is interacted with the size of the immigrant network, 
measured by the immigrant stock, higher levels of immigrant income correlate with lower 
immigrant network effects for both US exports (an estimated immigrant stock elasticity 
of 0.27%) and imports (an elasticity of 0.48%). Finally, using the level of immigrants’ 
income as a proxy variable to capture the extent of immigrant assimilation with the host 
country population, Mundra indicates that the immigrant network effect weakens as 
immigrants assimilate. 
Based on these empirical findings and on prior theoretical studies that suggest 
migration triggers a rise in bilateral trade flows through a number of channels, Egger et 
al. (2011) assesses the functional form of the impact of migration on trade flows in a 
quasi-experimental setting and provides evidence that suggests the relationship between 
migration and trade is not log-linear. In particular, the authors report that at low 
immigrant stock levels the elasticity of trade to migration is quite high but that it declines 
to zero at about 4,000 immigrants. If immigrant stocks exceed such a level, the results 
suggest that trade will not increase further. Accordingly, the authors conclude that while 
the influences of cross-country networks and of other effects related to migration 
materialize at relatively at low levels of migration, there appears to be satiation as 
immigrant numbers increase. 
Compiling elasticity estimates of immigrants’ influences on their host countries’ 
imports from and exports to their home countries from 48 studies published since the 
1990s, Genc et al. (2011) conduct a meta-analysis of the distribution of estimated effects. 
Correcting for heterogeneity and publication bias, they indicate that a 10 percent increase 
in the number of immigrants may be expected to increase the volume of trade, on 
average, by about 1.5 percent. However, the impact is lower for trade in homogeneous 
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goods and, over time, the magnitudes of the elasticity estimates decrease with growing 
immigrant stocks. They also report that while the typical estimated immigrant effect on 
imports (that is, the estimated elasticity) is larger than that of exports in about half of the 
studies considered, the publication bias and heterogeneity-corrected elasticity is slightly 
larger for exports as compared to imports. Finally, and more importantly, the authors 
indicate that the magnitudes of the estimates from these studies are often affected by the 
choice of covariates, the nature of the data (that is, cross-sectional or panel) and the 
estimation technique. They conclude that elasticity estimates vary between countries in 
ways that cannot be fully explained by study characteristics, trade restrictions, and 
immigration policies that may matter for the impact of immigration on trade.  
While the noted observations, along with the results from prior studies that date 
back to the seminal work of Gould (1994), provide important information on the roles 
that immigrants may play in influencing trade between their host and home countries, 
because the studies have been undertaken from the perspectives of the host countries the 
literature potentially suffers from several limitations. First, these studies do not capture 
all avenues through which immigrants may influence their home countries’ trade with 
countries other than those that serve as the immigrants’ host. Second, it is likely that 
differences exist in the roles that immigrants play as facilitators of host country exports to 
their home countries and of home country imports from their host countries. These 
differences may correspond with variation across home countries in terms of the 
persistence of immigrants’ cultural and ethnic ties. Finally, as indicated by Tadesse and 
White (2011), host country-oriented studies of the immigrant-trade link also fail to 
account for potential “Dutch disease” effects of immigrants on the export sector of small 
economies such as those in Africa. Thus, the results from studies that have focused on 
trade between immigrants’ host countries and a given cohort of home countries, while 
informative, do not allow us to infer whether, for all home countries, immigrants exert 
positive effects on their respective home country’s trade with the typical host country. By 
examining the immigrant-trade relationship from the perspective of immigrants home 
countries, in addition to overcoming the limitations of previous studies, we provide a 
better understanding of the economic effects of immigrants on developing home 
countries’ trade in general and on African countries’ trade in particular. 
 
THE EMPIRICAL MODEL, DATA AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION 
 
To allow our results to be comparable to those of previous studies, we follow the 
literature and specify a variant of the gravity model where the volume of bilateral trade 
(exports or imports:
ijTR ) between an immigrant’s home country (denoted by the 
subscript i) and their host country (denoted by the subscript j) is presented as an 
increasing function of the combined economic mass of the home-host country pairs, 
which is represented by their Gross Domestic Product values (GDP), Yi and Yj, 
respectively, and as a decreasing function of the geodesic distance (GDij) between them. 
Equation (1) illustrates the basic model.  
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GDP data are from the World Bank (2008). Trade data are from the International 
Trade Centre (2008). Geodesic distances between the capital cities of trading partners, 
used as a proxy for transportation costs, have been calculated by the authors using the 
great circle method.  is the constant of proportionality, and 1, 2, and 3 are 
coefficients to be estimated.  
While a straightforward extension of Anderson and van Wincop’s (2003) 
presentation, Equation (1) predicts strictly positive realizations of trade flows between the 
home countries of African immigrants and their respective host countries. However, for 
various reasons, including the infeasibility of trade, the lack of imports and/exports 
during a given year between otherwise potential trading partners (for example, due to 
changes in trade policy), and the amount of trade taking place being less than a reportable 
threshold, trade data often contain observations where values are equal to zero. Hence, 
following Ranjan and Tobias (2005), Eaton and Tamura (1994) and Head and Ries 
(1998), we modify equation (1) to permit the realization of such zero trade values. The 
result is provided as equation (2). 
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In equation (2),
   is a fixed amount of trade that is subtracted from the level 
predicted by equation (1) so that, when the latent trade values are negative, observed 
imports and/or exports will be set to zero. Thus, the observed trade flow between an 
African immigrant’s home country i and their host country j can be described 
as 



 0,max
~
ijij TRTR . Substituting this identity, augmenting equation (2) with 
variables that represent factors that may facilitate or inhibit bilateral trade flows, taking 
natural logarithms of the continuous variables on both sides of the resulting equation, and 
adding an assumed independently and identically distributed error term, ij , yields 
equation (3), our empirical model.
1
 
 
j6i5ij4j3i2ij10ij lnPOPβlnPOPβlnGDβlnYβlnYβlnIMββlnTR         
         
jOPENβOPENβlnREMβlnREMβΔlnEXRβ 11i10j9i8ij7       
       ijij16ij15j14i13ij12
εADJTβLANGβLLOCKβLLOCKβRTAβ 
              
(3) 
 
IMij
 
is the stock of immigrants from home country i residing in host country j 
(Ratha and Shaw, 2007).
2
 The variables POPi and POPj
 
represent home and host country 
population sizes, respectively, and are included in our specification to capture the import 
demand and/or export supply of the home and host countries. The annual change in the 
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home-host country exchange rate (ln EXRij), computed as ln EXRijt – ln EXRijt-1, 
captures the effects of changes in the terms of trade (IMF, 2008). Expressed as home 
country currency units per host country currency unit, an increase in the value of this 
variable indicates the depreciation of home country j’s currency vis-à-vis the host country 
i’s currency and, thus, is expected to correspond with an increase in the home country j’s 
exports to the host country i and a decrease in the home country j’s imports from the host 
country i.  
To control for each home country’s relative lack of external trading 
opportunities, we follow Wagner et al. (2002) and include measures of home and host 
country economic remoteness (REMi and REMj), given for country j as 
  

K
k
jkwk GDSTGDPGDP
1
///1
 
where GDPw represents gross global product and k 
identifies potential trading partners for home country j other than host country i.
3
 Lastly, 
following Head and Ries (1998), we capture each home and host country’s general 
propensity to trade (OPENi and OPENj) by including the sum of each country’s total 
imports and exports divided by its GDP. These variables measure each country’s general 
trade intensity since GDP represents a country’s ability to engage in trade (either in terms 
of income (importing) or output (exporting)). All values, where necessary, have been 
normalized to 2000 US dollars.  
We also include several dummy variables in our empirical model. Capturing the 
effects of joint membership in major regional trade agreements, we include a dummy 
variable (RTAij) which takes the value to one if both the home and the host countries are 
parties to the same regional trade agreement (Ghosh and Yamarik, 2004).
4
 Limao and 
Venables (2001) report land transport to be seven times more costly than transport by 
water, and Brooks (2008) estimates that every one percent reduction in transportation 
costs leads to a two percent rise in a country’s exports. To control for related costs, we 
include the dummy variables (LLOCKi and LLOCKj) which take the value of one if either 
country i or country j, respectively, is landlocked. Following Dunlevy (2006) and 
Hutchinson (2002), who indentify common language as a determinant of trade flows in 
gravity specifications, we include a dummy variable (LANGij)
 
which is equal to one if the 
host and home countries share a common language. Similarly, we include the dummy 
variable (ADJTij)
 
which takes a value of one if the home and host countries share a 
common border. Data on the geographic location of each country, languages and the 
adjacency of each pair of home and host countries in our data are from CIA (2008).  
Equation (2) presents a baseline augmented gravity equation that conforms to 
most empirical models used in the previous studies. Estimation of equation (3) allows for 
determination of whether a general immigrant-trade relationship exists for the cohort of 
110 host nations and 43 African home nations in our data during our reference year. 
Hence, the sign and significance of the coefficient of the immigrant stock variable in 
equation (3) will inform us of whether African immigrants generally exert the 
hypothesized positive effects on trade flows between their home and host countries 
without reference to a particular host/home country. A priori, we expect the coefficient of 
the immigrant stock variable to have a positive sign (i.e., 1 > 0).  
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Given that our data represent 110 host countries (a number that is significantly 
larger than the counts of home countries included in any previous study) and that the 
influences of immigrants on trade may vary from one home country to another, we also 
estimate a variant of equation (3) for each home country in our data. While controlling 
for the potential effects of factors that host country-oriented studies often fail to account 
for, the results obtained from these estimations allow us to evaluate the effects of 
immigrants on each African home country’s trade with the host countries in our data set.5 
An additional, but minor, modification of equation (3) allows the estimation of average 
import/export effects for each home country in our study. Equation (4) illustrates the 
resulting model.  
      
   iijji
i
iijiij POPGDYYxHOMEIMTR lnlnlnlnlnln 5432
43
1
10   
  
                  ijiijj
OPENREMREMEXRPOP 109876 lnlnlnln    
                  ijjiijj
LANGLLOCKLLOCKRTAOPEN 1514131211    
       
ij
110
2j
j18j
43
2i
i17iij16 ε)(HOSTβ)(HOMEβADJTβ 

                       (4) 
The dummy variables HOMEi and HOSTj, respectively, take the value of one for 
each of the home (i = 1, 2, 3…, 43) and host (j = 2, 3, …, 110) countries and are equal to 
zero otherwise. i1 , the coefficient of the interaction term between the stock of 
immigrants from a given home and the dummy variable representing the specific HOMEi 
country, indicates the home country-specific average effects of immigrants residing in the 
typical host country. Replacing the home country-specific dummy variables
 
with each of 
the host country-specific dummy variables HOSTj (j = 1,.., 110) and re-estimating 
equation (4), we obtain the host country-specific average effects of immigrants on trade 
flows with the typical home country. Finally, to indicate the economic significance of the 
effects of immigrants on their respective home country’s trade and to compare the 
magnitudes of the effects across immigrants from different home countries, using the 
coefficients derived from equation (4) we estimate the additional amount of trade 
(exports and imports) that would be generated per-immigrant from each of our reference 
home countries.  
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables included in our model. During 
our reference year, 2005, about 3,652 immigrants from the typical African home country 
resided in the typical host country in our data set. The typical host country exported 
roughly $1.10 worth of goods ($39.8 million) to the typical home country for every $1.00 
worth of goods ($35.7 million) it imported from the typical home country. The typical 
host and home countries are located about 6,828 miles apart. While the typical African 
home country has a GDP of about $15 billion, a population of about 17 million, and a 
trade openness value of 0.83, the typical host nation has a GDP of $340 billion (23 times 
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larger than the typical African home nation’s GDP), a population of 38.3 million (more 
than double that of the typical African home nation), and a slightly higher (0.97) trade 
openness value. Fewer than 10 percent of the included home and host countries share the 
same official language or are members to one or more of the same regional trading 
agreements. Also, only 2 percent of country pairs share common borders. Finally, about 
30 percent of the home nations and 21 percent of African immigrants’ host nations are 
landlocked. Accounting for factors that may facilitate or hinder bilateral trade flows, we 
examine the extent to which immigrants from African home nations affect bilateral trade 
between their respective home and host nations. To this end, information on the 
distribution of African emigrants across different host countries and their respective host 
nation’s trade relations with different African home nations is relevant. Table 2 lists the 
number of African home nations that each of the host countries in our study have trade 
relations with and each of the host nations’ average stock of immigrants from the African 
home nations. Ranging from Tajikistan, which trades with only nine of the African home 
nations in our sample, to the US and the UK which have trade relations with almost all of 
the African home nations, the home nations in our study account for about 31 percent of 
the countries in the world that have trade relations with a typical host nation in our data. 
Furthermore, during our reference year, 31 of the 110 nations did not host any 
immigrants from the cohort of African nations. Across host nations outside of the 
continent, the largest stocks of African immigrants are found in France (3.7 million), 
Spain (891,274), the UK (708,469), and the US (673,543). Among host nations within 
Africa, Cote d'Ivoire and South Africa, followed by the Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda, 
host relatively larger numbers of immigrants from other African home nations.  
 
TABLE 1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE 
 VARIABLES IN THE MODEL 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Host Country Exports (thousands US$) 39,781.57 301,969.70 
Host Country Imports (thousands US$) 35,705.85 231,255.80 
Immigrant Stock 3,652.33 37,324.86 
Geodesic Distance between Home and Host Countries 6,828.77 3,499.56 
Home Country GDP (billions of US$) 15.10 32.00 
Host Country GDP (billions of US$) 340.00 1,250.00 
Home Country Population (millions) 17.30 18.90 
Host Country Population (millions) 38.30 117.00 
Percent Change in Exchange Rate 1.43 3.59 
Home Country Economic Remoteness 467,503.80 789,782.00 
Host Country Economic Remoteness 160,428.10 448,237.70 
Home Country Trade Openness 0.83 0.46 
Host Country Trade Openness 0.97 0.58 
Home Country Landlocked (dummy variable) 0.30 0.46 
Home Country Landlocked (dummy variable) 0.21 0.41 
Home-Host Country Adjacency (dummy variable) 0.02 0.14 
Common Language in Home and Host Countries (dummy variable) 0.09 0.29 
Host-Home Membership in Common Regional Trade  
Agreement(s) (dummy variable)                                      0.08 0.28 
Standard deviations in parentheses.
  
 
 
 
 
208 
 
 
TABLE 2 
TRADE RELATIONSHIPS OF AFRICAN NATIONS AND CONCENTRATION/DISPERSION  
OF AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS ACROSS HOST COUNTRIES 
Host 
No. of African  
Countries with 
which  
the Host has 
Trade Ties 
Average Stock of  
Immigrants from  
African Home Country 
Host 
No. of African  
Countries with which  
the Host has Trade Ties 
Average Stock of Immigrants  
from African Home Country 
Albania 37 0 (0) Korea, Republic 43 0 (0) 
Argentina 43 0 (0) Kyrgyz Republic 27 0 (0) 
Armenia 33 0 (0) Latvia 40 0 (0) 
Australia 43 4,096.52 (13,218.12) Lesotho 19 173.43 (684.39) 
Austria 43 430.36 (1,783.05) Lithuania 41 0.47 (0.97) 
Bangladesh 25 0 (0) Luxembourg 43 146.61 (465.43) 
Belarus 43 0 (0) Macao 23 0 (0) 
Belgium 43 3,364.46 (12,522.67) Macedonia, FYR 40 16.04 (101.45) 
Belize 28 1.94 (4.5) Madagascar 41 435.41 (1949.18) 
Benin 25 1,398.19 (4,896.05) Malawi 41 5,366.97 (25,480.37) 
Bolivia 39 3.81 (6.92) Malaysia 43 0 (0) 
Brazil 43 103.1 (517.17) Mauritania 26 2,112.26 (8,480.08) 
Brunei 22 0 (0) Mauritius 42 43.07 (198.53) 
Bulgaria 43 0 (0) Mexico 43 18.38 (42.05) 
Burkina Faso 25 15,565.2 (60,981.42) Moldova 41 0 (0) 
Cambodia 21 0 (0) Mozambique 40 6,814.2 (23,245.59) 
Cameroon 40 821.48 (4,691.45) Namibia 40 1,303.87 (6,055.25) 
Canada 43 6,624.15 (10,438.85) Netherlands 43 5,578.96 (24,026.54) 
Cape Verde 37 31.15 (143.57) New Zealand 43 756.61 (3,652.09) 
Cent. Af. Rep. 23 465.8 (1,420.21) Nicaragua 40 5.18 (13.87) 
Chad 22 4,484 (14,555) Norway 43 440.88 (865.62) 
Chile 40 25.07 (54.62) Panama 27 7.24 (15.14) 
Colombia 43 6.24 (20.85) Papua New Guinea 19 0 (0) 
Comoros 20 1,051.23 (4,701.24) Paraguay 37 4.07 (24.77) 
Costa Rica 40 0 (0) Peru 42 4.77 (8.28) 
Cote d'Ivoire 42 47,589.43 (174,800.7) Philippines 43 41.47 (116.97) 
Croatia 43 0 (0) Poland 43 37.36 (77.59) 
Czech Republic 43 36.1 (62.58) Portugal 43 4,390.32 (15,963.41) 
Denmark 43 427.34 (866.52) Romania 42 0 (0) 
Dominica 29 0 (0) Russian Federation 43 0 (0) 
Dom.Republic 21 12.47 (29.04) Rwanda 39 2,668.4 (15,544.35) 
Ecuador 38 5.25 (10.34) Senegal 42 6,296.01 (21,305.81) 
El Salvador 37 0 (0) Slovak Republic 43 5.62 (9.01) 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
Host 
No. of African 
Countries  
with which the 
Host has  
Trade Ties 
Average Stock of Immigrants 
from African Home Country 
Host 
No. of 
African  
Countries 
with which 
the Host  
has Trade 
Ties 
Average Stock of Immigrants from African Home 
Country 
Equatorial Guinea 21 76.66 (351.29) Slovenia 42 0 (0) 
Estonia 40 0 (0) South Africa 42 26,293.6 (92,997.36) 
Ethiopia 41 7,508.34 (45,908.05) Spain 43 20,727.32 (105,367.3) 
Finland 43 132.13 (249.36) Sudan 40 14,520.72 (64,314.24) 
France 43 71,481.84 (241,447.9) Swaziland 25 1,388.11 (5,083.35) 
Gabon 40 4,390.28 (11,467.01) Sweden 43 1,055.83 (2,080.11) 
Gambia, The 33 6,553.09 (22,983.65) Switzerland 42 1,400.37 (2,126.28) 
Georgia 32 0 (0) 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 32 0 (0) 
Germany 43 8,285.6 (18,212.74) Tajikistan 9 0 (0) 
Greece 43 973.67 (4,350.25) Tanzania 42 11,082.25 (32,882.84) 
Guatemala 40 0.64 (3.54) Thailand 43 0 (0) 
Guinea-Bissau 18 617.18 (2,295.72) Togo 24 1,730.93 (7,916.05) 
Honduras 33 0.34 (0.94) 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 39 0 (0) 
Hong Kong 42 0 (0) Tunisia 42 499.5 (2,370.95) 
Hungary 43 34.99 (83.83) Turkey 43 94.93 (192.63) 
Iceland 34 11.48 (27.8) Uganda 41 10,034.13 (30,931.88) 
India 43 103.26 (423.91) Ukraine 43 0 (0) 
Iran 41 0 (0) 
United 
Kingdom 43 16,476.03 (34,155.82) 
Ireland 43 457.19 (1,423.4) United States 43 15,663.79 (27,403.32) 
Israel 42 9,208.01 (36,610.82) Uruguay 39 4.82 (14.31) 
Italy 43 12,397.68 (45,552.16) Venezuela 38 34.25 (138.48) 
Japan 43 163.42 (363.99) Zambia 37 3,027.59 (10,213.15) 
Kazakhstan 40 0 (0) Total 36.5 3,624.12 (37,181.81) 
Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Comparing the relative stocks of African immigrants across host countries, we 
find that with the exception of France, Portugal and Italy (where they account for 49%, 
35%, and 24%, respectively), African immigrants do not account for sizable proportions 
of the total immigrant populations in host nations located outside of Africa. In the UK 
and in the US, for example, immigrants of African origin accounted for 16 percent and 2 
percent of the immigrant populations, respectively. On the contrary, in more than 50 
percent of the host nations within the region, African immigrants accounted for more than 
67 percent of the total immigrant stock in each host country. The relatively larger 
proportion of immigrants of African descent in several host nations within the region, as 
compared to host nations in other regions, when coupled with the economic and social 
reasons that generally induce immigrants to choose a country as their host nation, suggest 
that many of the immigrants in African host nations are refugees.  
The presence of variation in the proportion of the stock of African immigrants 
among host nations within and outside the region underscores the need to examine 
whether or not the immigrant-trade link reported in prior studies applies to immigrants of 
African origin both from their home and their host countries’ perspectives. Thus, we first 
address the general immigrant-trade link from the host nations’ perspectives. We then 
proceed to consider the effect of immigrants on each home country’s trade with the 
typical host nation. 
 
The African Immigrant-Trade Relationship  
 
In Table 3, we present both the coefficients and the decomposition of the estimated 
effects (that is, the trade-initiation effects and trade-intensification effects) for each of the 
variables included in our base model (presented as equation (2)). The results were 
obtained from application of the Tobit regression technique using both host nations’ 
imports from [columns (a)-(c)] and exports to [columns (d)-(f)] each of the African home 
countries in our study as the dependent variable series. We employ the Tobit technique 
for two reasons that are specific to our trade data and research questions. First, even 
though they serve as hosts to immigrants from African home countries, some host nations 
in our study have no trade relationship with the African home countries in our study, 
resulting in a zero value for the dependent variable series during the reference year.
6
 A 
zero value of trade for a given year, however, may not imply a lack of trade relationship 
between the countries, since a zero trade value may arise, for example, due to the total 
volume of transactions conducted being lower than a reportable threshold. The use of the 
Tobit technique enables us to account for the prevalence of zero trade values without 
necessarily equating zero with the lack of a trade relationship in other years (Eaton and 
Tamura, 1994). Second, a rise in the volume of bilateral trade flows between a given pair 
of host and home countries may indicate an increase in the level of existing trade (for 
example, as a result of a rise in the demand for goods already being traded or for different 
sets of goods and/or a fall in transactions costs that may be attributed to immigrants) or 
the initiation of new trade (for example, due to new transactions involving goods that 
were not previously traded), or a combination of both events. In addition to accounting 
for zero trade values, the Tobit technique allows the decomposition of the estimated 
effects of changes in a variable on home-host country trade flows into separate trade-
initiation and trade-intensification effects.  
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We begin our discussion of the results by referencing the coefficient estimates of 
the immigrant stock variable reported in Table 3. It is from these coefficients that we 
confirm whether the generally-reported pro-trade effect of immigrants applies to 
immigrants of African descent. We observe that the Tobit coefficients of the immigrant 
stock variable (in both the host imports and host exports regressions) are positive and 
highly significant (p<0.01), indicating that immigrants of African descent exert the 
hypothesized pro-trade effects on their host country’s imports from and exports to their 
home countries. While the coefficients are not directly interpretable, given the double-
logarithmic functional form of the estimation equation and, specifically, the size of the 
Tobit regression parameters, which are very small relative to the median host-home 
country trade values in our study, following Head and Ries (2002) we heuristically 
interpret the Tobit coefficients as elasticity estimates. Accordingly, the estimates 
presented in columns (a) and (d) indicate that a one percent increase in the stock of 
African immigrants in the typical host country corresponds with respective increases of 
0.259 percent and 0.132 percent in the host country’s imports from and exports to the 
typical African home country.  
Comparing the relative effects of immigrants on their typical host nation’s 
imports and exports, the results indicate that the observed effect of African immigrants on 
the typical host country’s imports is nearly twice the magnitude of their effect on the 
host’s exports to their respective home countries. These findings correspond with the 
observation of Dunlevy and Hutchinson (1999, 2001), Wagner et al., (2002) and Bryant 
et al., (2004) who, among others, report that immigrants exert greater effects on their host 
country’s imports than on their host’s exports to the typical home country.7 
Decomposing the coefficients into trade-initiation and trade-intensification 
effects (reported, respectively, in columns (b) and (c) for host imports and columns (e) 
and (f) for host exports), we observe that both effects are significant. Accordingly, while 
a one percent increase in the stock of African immigrants in a given host nation would 
raise the likelihood that the given host country’s imports from the typical African home 
country by 0.0166 percent, it would raise the volume of imports by about 0.172 percent.
8
 
The corresponding initiation and intensification effects on the host country’s exports to 
the typical African home country are 0.005 percent and 0.08 percent, respectively.   
Turning to the remaining variables included in the base model, we find that with 
one exception, all coefficients are of the a priori expected signs. Hence, as hypothesized, 
higher GDP values correspond with increased host country exports and imports, and 
greater geodesic distance between the typical African immigrants’ host and home nations 
has a negative effect on bilateral trade. Again, consistent with the hypothesized positive 
effects of market size, the coefficients of the population variables are positive and 
significant in both regressions. The coefficients of the variable representing the change in 
the home-host country exchange rate are statistically insignificant in both regressions. 
While greater host country economic remoteness is detrimental to a nation’s exports and 
imports, unexpectedly, the typical African home nation’s economic remoteness 
corresponds with increased imports and exports.  
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TABLE 3. TOBIT ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF  
AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS ON HOST-HOME COUNTRY TRADE 
 
 Host Imports (Home Exports) 
         (a)        (b)    (c) 
ln Immigrantsij 0.259*** 0.172*** 0.0166*** 
 (0.0253) (0.0168) (0.00162) 
ln GDPj (Home) 2.685*** 1.785*** 0.172*** 
 (0.201) (0.134) (0.0129) 
ln GDPi (Host) 0.278* 0.185* 0.0178* 
 (0.147) (0.0975) (0.0094) 
ln Geographic Distanceij -1.510*** -1.004*** -0.0967*** 
 (0.117) (0.0775) (0.00747) 
ln Populationj (Home) 0.348*** 0.232*** 0.0223*** 
 (0.0693) (0.0461) (0.00444) 
ln Populationi (Host) 0.453*** 0.301*** 0.0290*** 
 (0.0610) (0.0405) (0.00391) 
 ln Exchange Rateij 0.0273 0.0182 0.00175 
 (0.0182) (0.0121) (0.00116) 
ln Econ. Remot.i (Home) 1.404*** 0.933*** 0.0899*** 
 (0.205) (0.136) (0.0131) 
ln Econ. Remot.j (Host) -0.706*** -0.469*** -0.0452*** 
 (0.131) (0.0869) (0.00837) 
Trade Opennessj (Home) 1.640*** 1.090*** 0.105*** 
 (0.161) (0.107) (0.0103) 
Trade Opennessi (Host) 0.953*** 0.634*** 0.0610*** 
 (0.111) (0.0741) (0.00714) 
Regional Trade Agreementij 2.104*** 1.554*** 0.0985*** 
 (0.262) (0.174) (0.0168) 
Landlockedj (Home) -0.847*** -0.550*** -0.0574*** 
 (0.132) (0.0881) (0.00849) 
Landlockedi (Home) -0.886*** -0.569*** -0.0616*** 
 (0.151) (0.100) (0.00965) 
Common Languageij 1.542*** 1.108*** 0.0791*** 
 (0.193) (0.129) (0.0124) 
Adjacent (Home and Host)ij -0.667 -0.425 -0.0473 
 (0.450) (0.299) (0.0288) 
Constant -75.16*** -49.96*** -4.814*** 
 (8.465) (5.627) (0.542) 
Observations 4,112   
Pseudo R-Squared 0.613   
Log Likelihood Ratio -8,657   
Sigma (Std. Error) 3.33 (0.046)**   
Chi-Squared (df) 3,119 (167)***   
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
 Host Exports (Home Imports) 
      (d)     (e)   (f) 
ln Immigrantsij 0.132*** 0.0800*** 0.00503*** 
 (0.0232) (0.0176) (0.00111) 
ln GDPj (Home) 1.342*** 1.002*** 0.0631*** 
 (0.184) (0.140) (0.00879) 
ln GDPi (Host) 1.030*** 0.887*** 0.0558*** 
 (0.132) (0.101) (0.00633) 
ln Geographic Distanceij -2.132*** -1.580*** -0.0994*** 
 (0.107) (0.0812) (0.00511) 
ln Populationj (Home) 0.260*** 0.219*** 0.0138*** 
 (0.0636) (0.0484) (0.00305) 
ln Populationi (Host) 0.321*** 0.188*** 0.0118*** 
 (0.0560) (0.0424) (0.00267) 
 ln Exchange Rateij 0.0176 0.00916 0.000576 
 (0.0166) (0.0126) (0.000795) 
ln Econ. Remot.i (Home) 0.468** 0.365** 0.0230** 
 (0.188) (0.143) (0.00898) 
ln Econ. Remot.j (Host) -0.512*** -0.277*** -0.0174*** 
 (0.117) (0.0892) (0.00561) 
Trade Opennessj (Home) 0.495*** 0.330*** 0.0208*** 
 (0.148) (0.113) (0.0071) 
Trade Opennessi (Host) 1.624*** 1.155*** 0.0726*** 
 (0.101) (0.0770) (0.00484) 
Regional Trade Agreementij 1.677*** 1.318*** 0.0562*** 
 (0.241) (0.184) (0.0116) 
Landlockedj (Home) -1.417*** -1.129*** -0.0857*** 
 (0.121) (0.0927) (0.00583) 
Landlockedi (Home) -0.752*** -0.847*** -0.0648*** 
 (0.138) (0.106) (0.00666) 
Common Languageij 1.714*** 1.672*** 0.0657*** 
 (0.179) (0.135) (0.00848) 
Adjacent (Home and Host)ij -0.587 -0.0845 -0.00549 
 (0.415) (0.315) (0.0198) 
Constant -43.71*** -36.35*** -2.287*** 
 (7.715) (5.867) (0.369) 
Observations 4,112   
Pseudo R-Squared 0.701   
Log Likelihood Ratio -8,503   
Sigma (Std. Error) 3.06 (0.042)**   
Chi-Squared (df) 
3,957 
(167)*** 
  
Standard errors in parentheses. "***", "**", and "*" indicate significance from zero at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively 
 
The coefficients of the variables representing the trade openness of both the host 
and the home nations are positive and significant across all estimations. This indicates 
that the volume of bilateral trade flows between the typical African immigrants’ host and 
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home countries is larger the more open the host and the home countries generally are to 
trading. Similarly, if the typical African immigrants’ home and host nations are parties to 
the same regional trade agreement(s) or share a common language, they tend to trade 
more with one another relative to those host-home nation pairs that are not members to 
the same regional trade agreement(s) or that do not share a common language. Indicative 
of the importance of port facilities and the higher costs associated with land transport as 
compared to sea transport, we find that the volume of trade between African immigrants’ 
home and host nations is lower if one or both of the host and the home countries lack 
coastal access.  
As has been observed in previous studies for migrants from many other 
countries, the results presented here indicate that migrants from African countries 
typically exert statistically significant and economically considerable positive effects on 
their host nation’s trade with their home countries. Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, 
whether this finding uniformly applies to immigrants from each African home country 
and to migrants from African nations who reside in each host nation are empirical 
questions that cannot be answered using the results from our base model. As the latter 
question has been investigated for several host nations, we focus on the former. 
 
Examining the Effects of Immigrants from the Home Countries’ Perspectives  
 
Having confirmed that immigrants of African descent exert pro-trade effects that are 
comparable to those documented by prior studies for immigrants from other countries, we 
turn our attention to the question: do immigrants from each African home country exert 
positive effects on trade between their respective home and host countries? We address 
this question because, although the results presented in Table 3 allow us to say that the 
immigrant-trade link observed from previous studies also applies, generally, to 
immigrants from African countries, we cannot infer whether similar effects are observed 
for immigrants from each home country. Two important factors dictate the need for 
further analysis; namely, variation in the average stock of immigrants from each of the 
African home countries and considerable differences in their concentration/dispersion 
across different host countries. The values presented in column (a) of Table 4 indicate 
considerable differences in the number of countries that host immigrants from different 
African nations: varying from fewer than 85 countries (for Lesotho, Eritrea, Chad and 
Guinea-Bissau, etc) to more than 100 countries (for Algeria, Ethiopia and Kenya, etc). 
The values clearly reveal that while immigrants from some African countries are found in 
just a few host countries, immigrants from several other home countries are found in 
more than 85 percent of the host countries in our data.  
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TABLE 4. EFFECTS OF AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS ON HOME COUNTRY’S  
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS TO A TYPICAL HOST  
Emigrants' Home Country 
(a) (b) (c) 
Number of Host 
Countries 
Host Import 
(Home Exports) 
Host Exports 
(Home Imports) 
Algeria 109 0.2465 (0.1253)* -0.0166 (0.1143) 
Benin 82 0.4304 (0.1841)** 0.0065 (0.142) 
Botswana   108 0.6396 (0.1684)*** 0.4635 (0.1639)*** 
Burkina Faso  82 0.3559 (0.1804)* 0.0822 (0.1733) 
Cameroon   106 0.3031 (0.132)** 0.307 (0.1307)** 
Cape Verde  98 0.2756 (0.0745)*** 0.1939 (0.108)* 
Central African Republic 86 0.5742 (0.1744)*** 0.1767 (0.145) 
Chad   76 0.3646 (0.2624) 0.0674 (0.1992) 
Comoros   73 0.3469 (0.1246)*** 0.3804 (0.1587)** 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 81 0.3305 (0.1253)*** 0.1506 (0.1261) 
Cote d'Ivoire  108 0.1259 (0.118) 0.0055 (0.1107) 
Djibouti   74 0.1318 (0.2029) 0.0811 (0.2177) 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 92 0.1493 (0.0732)** -0.077 (0.0926) 
Equatorial Guinea  80 0.7668 (0.2497)*** 0.2914 (0.1964) 
Eritrea   74 0.2492 (0.1108)** 0.1831 (0.1125) 
Ethiopia   106 0.3632 (0.095)*** 0.1767 (0.1018)* 
Gabon   107 0.4721 (0.2005)** 0.1725 (0.1329) 
Gambia, The  91 0.2579 (0.1125)** 0.126 (0.1499) 
Ghana   106 0.0242 (0.0969) -0.0198 (0.1089) 
Guinea   88 0.3288 (0.152)** 0.0003 (0.1249) 
Guinea-Bissau   70 0.1256 (0.1463) 0.2469 (0.1598) 
Kenya   110 0.2781 (0.0901)*** -0.0755 (0.0818) 
Lesotho   72 0.0965 (0.1684) 0.0296 (0.1727) 
Madagascar   108 0.5105 (0.1001)*** 0.2074 (0.1247)* 
Malawi   107 0.3253 (0.1548)** 0.3361 (0.1383)** 
Mali   108 0.0836 (0.1105) -0.1052 (0.096) 
Mauritania   87 0.3669 (0.179)** 0.0086 (0.1545) 
Mauritius   108 0.3337 (0.1006)*** 0.1072 (0.1176) 
Morocco   108 -0.061 (0.0867) 0.0462 (0.0953) 
Mozambique   104 0.314 (0.1601)* 0.252 (0.1439)* 
Namibia   106 0.4381 (0.1304)*** 0.3485 (0.136)** 
Rwanda   99 0.1349 (0.1421) 0.3258 (0.1351)** 
Senegal   107 0.3048 (0.1089)*** 0.079 (0.1105) 
Seychelles   96 0.5634 (0.1603)*** 0.1363 (0.1506) 
South Africa  109 0.1526 (0.0685)** 0.0971 (0.0936) 
Sudan   105 0.1103 (0.1242) 0.1679 (0.1284) 
Swaziland   85 0.5529 (0.2445)** 0.1948 (0.2169) 
Tanzania   106 0.2815 (0.1088)** 0.0201 (0.1146) 
Togo   83 0.348 (0.1605)** 0.0577 (0.1557) 
Tunisia   109 0.1099 (0.1224) 0.1068 (0.119) 
Uganda   107 0.3411 (0.1174)*** 0.2213 (0.1169)* 
Zambia   101 0.1279 (0.1413) 0.1547 (0.1302) 
Zimbabwe   90 0.1293 (0.1227) 0.1296 (0.1006) 
See Table 3 notes  
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The results presented in columns (b) and (c) indicate that the pro-trade effects of 
immigrants observed from estimation of the general model do not necessarily apply to 
emigrants from every African nation. More specifically, while we find that immigrants 
from 31 of the 43 African countries (72% of the home countries) have the hypothesized 
positive and significant effects on their respective home nation’s exports (that is, the 
typical host nation’s imports), for only 11 of the 43 African home nations (26% of the 
home countries) is the case true when it comes to the imports of each African home 
country from a typical host (that is, the exports of the typical host). Similarly, we find the 
hypothesized positive effects on the home country-specific exports for 10 of the 11 home 
countries where positive effects are also found for their imports. Given the finding that 
African emigrants have the hypothesized pro-export effects for only 26 percent of the 
home countries and have pro-import effects for 72 percent of the African home countries, 
our observation from the general model of relatively smaller effects for the magnitude of 
African immigrants on their typical host country’s exports to the typical home is not 
surprising. In addition to the observed variation in the number of home countries for 
which immigrants from African nations are found to exert statistically significant pro-
trade effects, there exists considerable variation in the concentration/dispersion of 
immigrants originating from different home countries (that is, comparing the relative total 
numbers of migrants originating from each of the African home countries while taking 
into account the respective number of host countries in which they reside). Table 5 
presents the dispersion/concentration of immigrants from each of the African home 
nations across the host countries in our data together with the average imports and 
exports of each African home country. Accordingly, the values listed in column (a) of the 
table indicate that, while we find Kenyan and Algerian immigrants in more than 100 of 
the host countries included in our study and immigrants from Eritrea and Lesotho in 
fewer than 80 host nations, the relative sizes/concentrations of emigrants from Kenya, 
Eritrea and Lesotho in a typical host are not significantly different from one another. That 
is, for every Kenyan or Eritrean emigrant, we find roughly four Algerian emigrants.  
Given such differences in the relative sizes and dispersions of immigrants from 
different African home nations, it is perhaps not surprising to observe significant 
variation in the hypothesized pro-trade effects of emigrants across different home 
countries. Thus, we can say that our observation (or lack thereof) of variation in home 
country-specific immigrant effects, obtained when conducting the analysis from the home 
countries’ perspectives, may be attributed in part to the differences in the size (stock) of 
immigrants, the relative dispersion of the given stock and variation in the average amount 
of trade that each of the home nation conducts. To this end, using the results obtained 
from the estimation of equation (3) for each of the 43 home nations in our study, we 
present home country-specific per-immigrant effects in Table 6.
9
 The results further show 
that the observed home country-specific per-immigrant effects are of dissimilar 
magnitudes even across different home nations where we observe either pro-import or 
pro-export effects or both. Accordingly, among the 31 African home nations where 
immigrants had the hypothesized pro-exports effects, we find that the proportional effect 
of a one percent increase in the stock of emigrants on the respective home country’s 
exports vary from as low as 0.15 percent (in Egypt and South Africa) to 0.47 percent and 
0.64 percent (in Gabon and Botswana), respectively.
10
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TABLE 5. RELATIVE SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION OF IMMIGRANTS  
FROM DIFFERENT AFRICAN HOME NATIONS 
 
Home Country 
Number 
of Host 
Countries 
Immigrants 
Exports by 
Home 
Imports by 
Home Home 
Country 
Number 
of Host 
Countries 
Immigrants 
Exports by 
Home 
Imports by 
Home 
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) 
Algeria 109 14,944.91 373,968.40*** 149,106.70** Lesotho 72 3,285.59 6,191.52*** 1,422.88*** 
  (131,721) (1,311,983) (448,684)   (24,683) (44,165) (7,357) 
Benin 82 1,385.14** 979.19*** 6,808.27*** Madagascar 108 1,037.38*** 5,917.43*** 8,615.93*** 
  (7,751) (2,579) (19,401)   (7,937) (29,508) (27,284) 
Botswana 108 320.46*** 36,066.50 26,132.03 Malawi 107 796.95*** 3,794.22*** 8,141.73*** 
  (2,414) (293,386) (230,885)   (3,652) (11,482) (36,233) 
Burkina Faso 82 12,294.90 ---- ---- Mali 108 8,741.43 8,149.35*** 11,278.22*** 
  (109,533) ---- ----   (55,578) (43,751) (31,492) 
Cameroon 106 1,726.95** 18,857.24*** 15,900.03*** Mauritania 87 890.20*** ---- ---- 
  (7,331) (60,405) (49,502)   (5,146) ---- ---- 
Cape Verde 98 1,633.49** 838.53*** 4,394.13*** Mauritius 108 1,011.47*** 14,333.64*** 17,543.73*** 
  (6,717) (2,772) (18,243)   (4,720) (64,420) (42,475) 
Central African 
Rep. 86 147.12*** 1,699.42*** 1,350.48*** Morocco 108 22,825.89* 96,756.24 159,236.70*** 
  (1,137) (5,254) (4,608)   (106,525) (386,447) (450,304) 
Chad 76 1,121.07*** 21,870.43 4,019.80*** Mozambique 104 7,063.73 3,961.81*** 12,389.21*** 
  (6,448) (160,346) (11,672)   (35,758) (17,519) (63,277) 
Comoros 73 480.95*** ---- ---- Namibia 106 130.29*** 18,308.45** 19,910.70 
  (2,821) ---- ----   (663) (82,589) (180,012) 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 81 4,262.43 13,418.44*** 14,725.51*** Rwanda 99 1,812.11 993.93*** 2,422.12*** 
  (15,057) (63,671) (39,286)   (11,573) (4,536) (6,912) 
Cote d'Ivoire 108 1,190.16*** 43,955.70 29,305.40 Senegal 107 3,804.74 7,777.49*** 23,805.05** 
  (5,753) (160,551) (141,437)   (16,815) (23,553) (71,880) 
Djibouti 74 160.51*** 1,009.69*** 7,439.63*** Seychelles 96 112.75*** 2,408.57*** 4,677.70*** 
  (849) (7,097) (25,385)   (448) (11,245) (13,259) 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 92 4,870.51 104,177.40** 210,558.80*** South Africa 109 5,952.97 312,665.9*** 338,734.0*** 
  (16,491) (294,300) (445,831)   (22,897) (823,020) (896,772) 
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
 
Home Country 
Number 
of Host 
Countries 
Immigrants 
Exports by 
Home 
Imports by 
Home Home 
Country 
Number 
of Host 
Countries 
Immigrants 
Exports by 
Home 
Imports by 
Home 
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) 
Equatorial Guinea 80 989.50*** 51,592.23 10,588.27*** Sudan 105 2,616.05 6,564.61*** 35,979.98 
  (6,337) (192,169) (35,364)   (15,668) (34,164) (81,994) 
Eritrea 74 9,980.39 ---- ---- Swaziland 85 1,027.72** 19,922.11 20,436.90 
  (56,188) ---- ----   (8,743) (126,673) (157,227) 
Ethiopia 106 3,597.38 4,726.51*** 20,071.42*** Tanzania 106 1,628.32** 9,844.00*** 16,018.54*** 
  (16,612) (14,310) (50,209)   (7,218) (32,738) (45,305) 
Gabon 107 154.89*** 40,187.70 11,509.97*** Togo 83 657.02*** 1,116.24*** 5,158.52*** 
  (1,143) (295,065) (53,561)   (2,844) (2,602) (12,446) 
Gambia, The 91 508.78*** 42.51*** 3,204.95*** Tunisia 109 4,370.96 73,889.63 94,055.54 
  (1,953) (133) (6,807)   (36,092) (370,274) (365,658) 
Ghana 106 6,188.52 42,269.55 59,021.67 Uganda 107 1,322.90*** 4,152.16*** 9,653.51*** 
  (32,226) (184,699) (131,318)   (7,041) (12,232) (24,209) 
Guinea 88 3,963.33 ---- ---- Zambia 101 1,360.23*** 13,975.31*** 19,671.71* 
  (20,520) ---- ----   (6,168) (60,213) (112,535) 
Guinea-Bissau 70 1,436.24** 1,303.45*** 2,160.14*** Zimbabwe 90 7,734.07 12,348.04*** 17,651.51** 
  (5,957) (10,167) (7,650)   (54,168) (56,835) (88,124) 
Kenya 110 3,553.18 21,102.04** 30,561.28 
All 
Countries 110 3,652.33 40,976.81 41,706.26 
  (18,023) (70,033) (90,566)   (37,325) (315,258) (238,910) 
Eastern Africa  2,193.86 7,610.38 15,975.25 
Southern 
Africa  3,032.39 53,231.44 57,992.32 
  (209,277) (708,166) (1,233,824)   (304,455) (10,973,843) (11,835,931) 
Northern Africa  12,006.49 163,417.04 151,338.20 
Western 
Africa  2,896.13 18,966.97 15,445.17 
  (976,681) (15,037,250) (3,885,443)   (307,348) (1,745,855) (1,540,112) 
Mean values presented with standard deviations in parentheses. Statistical significance from the overall mean is denoted as follows: "***", "**", and 
"*" indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
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TABLE 6. ESTIMATE EFFECT OF A ONE PERCENT INCREASE IN AFRICAN 
IMMIGRANT STOCK ON THE HOME COUNTRY’S TRADE 
 
 Estimated Per-Immigrant Effect  Estimated Per-Immigrant Effect 
Home 
Country 
       Home 
Imports     Home Exports 
Home 
Country Home Imports Home Exports 
Algeria 29.54 (162.3) 32.41 (176.81) Lesotho 48.66 (382.59) 35.11 (259.03) 
Benin 
2.91 
(14.79)*** 3.67 (20.7)*** Madagascar 5.00* (16.55)** 6.93 (27.35)*** 
Botswana 25.07 (111.48) 40.07 (186.33) Malawi 85.14 (679.54) 88.42 (646.80) 
Burkina 
Faso 12.70 (79.3)* 14.22 (84.27)* Mali 3.21 (17.17)*** 4.25 (24.44)*** 
Cameroon 
11.82 
(56.08)** 13.51 (75.57)** Mauritania 31.37 (204.99) 44.69 (321.98) 
Cape 
Verde 0.16 (1.38)*** 0.26 (2.22)*** Mauritius 14.56 (54.94)** 16.36 (64.65)* 
Central 
African 
Rep. 
5.54 
(26.37)*** 6.32 (35.16)*** Morocco 14.84 (56.14)* 17.88 (65.89)* 
Chad 16.4 (84.91) 18.49 (88.38) Mozambique 39.21 (206.63) 39.1 (194.39) 
Comoros 
2.98 
(14.73)*** 3.26 (16.40)*** Namibia 70.49 (356.58) 71.04 (363.33) 
Congo, 
Dem. Rep. 
1.76 
(10.64)*** 3.05 (22.57)*** Rwanda 0.30 (1.134)*** 0.29 (1.20)*** 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 
132.93 
(869.83) 
160.57 
(1,152.08) Senegal 2.95 (20.42)*** 2.10 (10.67)*** 
Djibouti 1.01 (5.07)*** 1.46 (6.25)*** Seychelles 21.93 (102.36) 27.35 (147.53) 
Egypt, 
Arab Rep. 16.51 (56.17)* 15.23 (55.64)** South Africa 94.76 (334.89)* 105.24 (432.62) 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
543.95 
(2,790.18) 
745.99 
(4,287.37) Sudan 22.03 (163.03) 34.97 (262.15) 
Eritrea 1.10 (5.54)*** 1.36 (7.02)*** Swaziland 32.32 (155.23) 38.9 (162.68) 
Ethiopia 
4.36 
(19.67)*** 5.09 (24.01)*** Tanzania 8.53 (36.95)*** 6.91 (25.96)*** 
Gabon 46.36 (172.33) 76.47 (308.67) Togo 11.87 (55.77)** 27.84 (154.32) 
Gambia, 
The 0.29 (1.57)*** 0.42 (2.47)*** Tunisia 14.91 (42.66)** 14.50 (38.97)** 
Ghana 
4.81 
(17.02)*** 6.03 (23.57)*** Uganda 7.72 (26.3)*** 7.25 (28.07)*** 
Guinea 
4.15 
(18.45)*** 5.58 (29.78)*** Zambia 3.64 (15.78)*** 3.80 (16.89)*** 
Guinea-
Bissau 0.63 (4.26)*** 0.60 (3.74)*** Zimbabwe 12.03 (45.52)** 15.14 (66.53)** 
Kenya 
4.35 
(14.24)*** 3.88 (14.12)*** All Countries 31.99 (449.41) 39.65 (656.24) 
Eastern 
Africa 8.24(789.76) 10.09(1,137.03) 
Southern 
Afrca 46.94(3,538.74) 50.38(3,758.06) 
Northern 
Africa 19.06(820.33) 20.20(973.09) 
Western 
Africa 44.09(10,418.72) 59.79(14,180.34) 
See Table 5 notes
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The Economic Significance of the Variation in the Observed Effects  
 
As indicated above, controlling for heterogeneity in the trade and immigration structures 
of immigrants’ home nations, we find considerable variation in the observed effects of 
immigrants from different African home countries. Among other things, this variation 
may result from one or both of the following: (i) the existence of differences in the 
factors that underlie the ability of and the extent to which immigrants from various 
countries affect their respective home countries’ trade flows, and/or (ii) the presence of a 
threshold level in the size or dispersion of immigrant stocks beyond which the statistical 
significance of the observed effects of immigrants on their respective home nation’s trade 
might change. In particular, if such a threshold exists, it would allow the determination of 
when we might observe immigrant effects on home country’s trade, the level at which the 
effect can be optimized, and the ranges over which the effects are economically marginal 
or substantial. Leaving future research to identify the factors that may underlie the ability 
of and the extent to which immigrants from different countries affect their respective 
home countries’ trade, we thus turn to the determination of whether there is a threshold 
size (in the stocks of immigrants) at/beyond which we might observe a change in the 
pattern of the estimated home country-specific effects of immigrants. We do so by 
examining the distribution of the estimated home country-specific effects of immigrants 
(for both exports and imports) against the natural logarithm of the average stocks of 
immigrants from the home countries in our study.
11
 
Figure 1 clearly depicts a strong negative relationship between the observed 
home country-specific effects of immigrants (on exports) and the corresponding average 
size (stocks) of emigrants from each home country. This suggests that, although there is 
considerable variation in the extent to which immigrants from various African countries 
influence their respective home countries’ exports to their host countries, the magnitude 
of the observed effect is higher for home countries with relatively smaller average stocks 
of immigrants and it is lower for home countries characterized by relatively larger 
average stocks of emigrants. The scatter plot, however, does not suggest a threshold in 
the average stocks of immigrants at/beyond which the estimated home country-specific 
effects would start to change. We believe this is particularly so, first, because we find a 
number of African home countries for which the estimated immigrants’ effects are 
statistically insignificant both at low, medium and high levels of immigrant stocks. 
Second, our sample size is very small (just 43 home countries and data representing a 
single year). Finally, the lack of discernable threshold levels may be due to transaction 
costs (due to information asymmetries and lack of trade-facilitating infrastructure, etc) 
being more important determinants of the magnitudes of immigrants’ pro-trade effects. 
For example, if product and/or market-related information is sufficiently asymmetric 
and/or if trade-facilitating infrastructure is lacking (as is common among the reference 
African countries), then it may be that trade-related transaction costs are sufficiently high 
to constrain the emergence of a pattern in immigrants’ abilities to act as trade 
intermediaries.  
Consequently, given the differences in the number of countries that serve as 
hosts to immigrants from various African countries, the differences in the dispersion of 
immigrants from each of the home countries in our study and the variation in the trade 
structures of the African countries, inference about the relative economic significance of 
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the effects of immigrants on home country’s trade that can be made from the coefficient 
estimates presented in Table 4 is not entirely straightforward. For example, from Figure 
1, despite being significant, we observe that the relative magnitude of the estimated 
effects of emigrants from South Africa (denoted as SAF) is lower than that of many other 
African countries with relatively smaller average stocks of emigrants. However, South 
Africa has a relatively larger volume of exports and a larger average stock of emigrants 
than do many other African home nations in our study. As a result, the economic 
significance (that is, the actual dollar values of trade) of the observed 0.15 percent home  
 
FIGURE 1. HOME COUNTRY-SPECIFIC IMMIGRANT-EXPORT EFFECTS V. 
AVERAGE STOCK OF EMIGRANTS FROM EACH HOME COUNTRY 
(ACROSS THE 110 HOST COUNTRIES) 
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country-specific export effect of a one percent increase in the stocks of emigrants on 
South Africa’s trade with the typical host country may actually be greater than the 0.64 
percent increase that is expected to result from a corresponding one percent increase in 
the stocks of emigrants on Botswana’s exports to the typical host. Thus, to provide a 
better understanding of the economic significance of the estimated effects of immigrants 
on their respective home nation’s trade with a typical host, using the coefficient estimates 
obtained from country-specific estimation of equation (3), we quantify the per-immigrant 
dollar values of additional trade that would be generated in each of the home countries in 
our study. Tables 5 and 6, respectively, present the average actual export and import 
values of immigrants from each of the home nations in our study, the estimated dollar 
value of home country-specific per-immigrant effects.  
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The figures in the tables reveal an interesting contrast. While we find that the 
average level of trade (exports and imports) between, say, Algeria ($370 million), Egypt 
($104.2 million), Morocco ($96.8 million), and South Africa ($312.7 million) and a 
typical country that hosts immigrants from each of these countries are significantly larger 
than those observed for several other African home nations, the amount of additional 
trade that would be generated per-immigrant from each of these nations is not necessarily 
the highest, with the exception of those from South Africa. To this end, our results reveal 
that, ranging from $0 to $105 (for exports) and $0 to $94.8 (for imports), the amount of 
additional trade that a typical immigrant from a given home nation in Africa creates 
stands at an average of $40 (for the home country’s exports to), and $32 (for the home 
country’s imports) from a typical host.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Results from prior studies of the effects of immigrants on trade flows between their home 
and host countries that frequently focus on developed host countries indicate that 
immigrants generally exert positive influences. Extrapolating from these findings, based 
on results obtained from the analysis of data from major immigrant host countries and 
without analyzing the problem from the perspectives of the home countries, would 
suggest that the pro-trade effects observed for developed host countries extend to 
immigrants from all home nations. Based on analysis of the effects of immigrants on 
host-home trade flows between more than 100 countries, Tadesse and White (2011) 
indicate that such inference may be misleading. Given the presence of significant 
differences in the economic structures of host countries for which most available studies 
of the immigrant-trade link have been conducted and the diversity of immigrants’ home 
countries, generalization of the results observed for a few host countries to developing 
home/host nations, in general, and African countries in particular, where there is 
considerable heterogeneity in the trade and immigration structure, is therefore highly 
questionable. 
Using data for 43 African home countries, many of which have experienced 
rapid increases in emigration rates, and 110 host countries (43 countries in Africa and 67 
countries in other regions), we examine the immigrant-trade link from both the host and 
home countries’ perspectives and address the following questions: Do immigrants from 
African home countries influence bilateral trade flows between their host and home 
nations? Do the positive influences of immigrants on their host countries’ trade with their 
home countries observed from the analysis of other home countries extend to African 
home countries? And, if so, how consistent or variable are the observed effects across the 
African home countries that also have considerable differences in their trade and 
immigration structures?  
Our results, obtained using the Tobit regression technique, which allows us to 
account for potential zero trade values in a setting that is consistent with the existing 
literature (for examining the problem from host countries perspectives), indicate that a 
one percent increase in the proportional stock of African immigrants in a given host 
would raise the typical host nation’s exports to and imports from the given African home 
  
 
 
 
 
223 
 
 
country by 0.132 percent and 0.259 percent, respectively. Analysis of the effects from 
each of the African home country’s perspective, however, yields a different picture: 
increases in the stocks of immigrants originating from several African home countries, 
for which trade and immigration structures are highly divergent, do not necessarily 
produce increases in the respective home countries’ exports to or imports from the typical 
host country. To this end, while the hypothesized positive effects of immigrants on home 
countries’ exports were observed for only 31 of the African home countries, we find the 
associated effects on home country imports for just 12 of the 43 African home countries. 
Further, for only 11 of these home countries are the effects of immigrants on both the 
home countries’ exports and imports positive and statistically significant. We also find 
that the magnitudes of the observed effects are quite dissimilar across the home countries. 
As argued, these findings suggest that the extrapolation of the conclusions derived from 
findings conducted largely from the host countries’ perspectives to developing countries, 
may be erroneous. 
Given the heterogeneity in the trade and immigration structures of the home 
nations and despite the presence of positive effects of African immigrants on their typical 
host countries’ trade with their home countries, the significant variation in the observed 
effects of immigrants both in statistical and relative economic significance across the 
different countries implies the following: First, the prevalence of potentially different 
factors underlying the ability of and the extent to which immigrants from developing 
home countries in general, and African home countries in particular, are able to exert 
influences on their specific home countries’ trade (exports as well as imports) with their 
host countries. Second, there may exist a threshold in terms of the size or the dispersion 
of immigrant stocks beyond which they might be able to exert discernible effects on their 
respective home nations’ trade with their respective host nations. To this end, while 
scatter plots of the estimated home country-specific effects of immigrants against the 
stocks of immigrants from each home country and our measure of their respective 
dispersion indicate the presence of negative relationships, we were not able to identify 
threshold levels beyond which the observed effects may change.  
Two important implications for the formulation of social, immigration and 
economic policies could be directly inferred from these findings. First, the loss of human 
capital facing several African home countries due to emigration may not be as 
economically devastating as is often suggested by policy makers. This is because, 
consistent with observations from other studies, we show that immigrants of African 
descent have statistically significant and economically considerable impacts on trade 
flows between their home and host countries. This is particularly significant when 
considering our finding that in 31 of the 43 home countries considered, immigrants 
specifically enhance their home countries exports to their host nations. Second, given 
variation in the magnitudes of observed effects, it is clear that the benefit of enhanced 
migration across different home/host countries is starkly different. It is therefore 
important for economic and/or social policy makers in different African countries to 
focus on formulating country-specific policies towards migration instead of attempting to 
address it by adopting common policies at the regional level.  
Finally, given the lack of large panel or time-series data on the stock of 
immigrants from African home countries and, hence, the relatively small data set (one 
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year) that we utilize in this study, while they may serve as baseline estimates, our 
observations may not serve for formulating enhanced migration and trade policy 
measures. When home-country specific-emigrant stocks data over extended period of 
time are available, in addition to corroborating our observation, we suggest that future 
studies focus on establishing a threshold immigrant stock level at which immigrants start 
to have statistically significant pro-trade effects on their home countries’ trade as well as 
the level at which such effects may begin to taper off.  
 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1
 The gravity equation was first applied to trade flows by Tinbergen (1962). Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003), Feenstra et al. (2005), Eaton and Kortum (2002), Deardorff (1998), Davis (1995), 
Bergstrand (1985), Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Anderson (1979) provide theoretical 
foundations for the model. 
2 The bilateral migration matrix is available at http://go.worldbank.org/ HO0EXUQVV0. 
3 Internal distance, when k=j, is derived as 0.4 times the square root of the nation’s land mass 
(Head and Mayer, 2000). 
4 The Regional Trade Agreements considered are the European Union/European Economic 
Community, European Free Trade Arrangement, European Economic Area, Canada-US Free Trade 
Arrangement/North American Free Trade Agreement, Asia Pacific Economic Community, Central 
American Common Market, Latin America Free Trade Association/Latin America Integration 
Agreement, Andean Community, Caribbean Community/Carifta, Organization of Eastern 
Caribbean States, Southern Cone Common Market (Mercado Comùn del Sur), Group of Three, 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, The Papua New Guinea-Australia Trade and Commercial 
Relations Agreement, Bangkok Agreement, South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic 
Agreement, Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement, East Asian 
Economic Caucus, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation/SAARC Preferential 
Trading Arrangement, Central European Free Trade Area, Arab Common Market, Economic 
Cooperation Council, Gulf Cooperation Council, Economic and Monetary Community of Central 
Africa, East African Community/East African Co-operation, South African Customs Union 
Agreement, Economic Community of West African States, South Africa Development 
Community/Southern African Development Coordination Conference, and the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa. 
5 Given the cross-sectional nature of our data it should be noted that when estimating equation (2) 
for each home country in our data the home country-specific explanatory variables will drop out. 
6 A typical home country in our data has had no imports from or exports to roughly 17% of the host 
countries in the study during the reference year. 
7 The effect of immigrants on host country imports, however, does not have to exceed their effects 
on the host country exports to the home country. Girma and Yu (2002) and White (2007) for 
example, find greater effects of immigrants on their host country exports than imports. 
8 We repeated our analysis using 2006 trade flow data as well. Changes in the effects observed 
from using the 2005 trade data are marginal. 
9 In order to check the robustness of results obtained from our estimation of equation (3), we also 
estimate equation (2) for each of the home countries. 
10 These estimates were derived using the coefficients of the home country-specific stock of 
immigrants from the Tobit regression of exports or imports of the home country to all countries in 
our data. The estimated effects thus include the trade initiation and intensification effects. 
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11 While all the relationships we examine show the presence of a consistently negative relationship, 
although of various degrees, for the sake brevity, we present only the scatter plot of the distribution 
of the estimated home-country-specific exports effects against the logarithm of the corresponding 
average stocks of emigrants.  
 
 
REFERENCES  
 
Akokpari, J. (2006), Globalization, Migration, and the Challenges of 
Development in Africa, Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 
Vol.5, No. 3, pp. 125-153.  
Anderson, J.E. (1979), A Theoretical Foundation for the Gravity Equation, 
American Economic Review, Vol. 69, No.1, pp. 106-116. 
Anderson, J.E. and E. van Wincoop (2003), Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to 
the Border Puzzle, American Economic Review, Vol. 93, No.1, pp. 190-192. 
Bacarezza, C., G. Javier and L. Ehrlich (2006), The Impact of Migration on 
Foreign Trade: A Developing Country Approach, MPRA Paper No. 1090. Online. 
Available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1090/. 
Bergstrand, J.H. (1985), The Gravity Equation in International Trade: Some 
Microeconomic Foundations and Empirical Evidence, The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, Vol. 67, No. 3, pp. 474-81. 
Blanes, J.V. (2003), The Link between Immigration and Trade in Spain, 
Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Paper presented at XXVIII Simposio de Analisis 
Economico, 11-13 December, Seville.  
Bratti. M., L. De Benedictis, and G. Santoni (2011), On the Pro-trade Effects of 
Immigrants, Working Paper. Online. Available at:  
http://works.bepress.com/luca_de_benedictis/21. 
Brooks, D.H. (2008), Infrastructure and Asia's Trade Costs, Asian Development 
Bank Policy Brief No. 27 (June). Online. Available at: http://www.adbi.org/research-
policy-brief/2008/06/25/2598.infrastructure.asia.trade. costs/.  
Bryant, J., M. Genc and D. Law (2004), Trade and Migration to New Zealand, 
New Zealand Treasury Working Paper 04/18.  
Cattaneo, C. (2009), International Migration, the Brain Drain and Poverty: A 
Cross-country Analysis, The World Economy, Vol. 32, No.8, pp. 1180-1202. 
Chang, H.F. (1998), Migration as international trade: the economic gains from 
the liberalized movement of labor, Working Paper No. 166, John M. Olin Program in 
Law and Economics. 
Davis, D. (1995) Intra-Industry Trade: A Heckscher-Ohlin-Ricardo Approach, 
Journal of International Economics, Vol. 39, No.3-4, pp. 201-226. 
Deardorff, A. (1998), Determinants of Bilateral Trade: Does Gravity Work in a 
Neoclassical World? in Jeffrey Frankel (ed.) The Regionalization of the World Economy, 
University of Chicago Press. 
Docquier, F. (2007), Brain Drain in Developing Countries, World Bank 
Economic Review, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 193-218. 
  
 
 
 
 
226 
 
 
Dunlevy, J. (2006), The Influence of Corruption and Language on the Pro-trade 
Effect of Immigrants: Evidence from the American States, The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, Vol. 88, No.1, pp. 182-186. 
Dunlevy, J. and W. Hutchinson (1999), The Impact of Immigration on American 
Import Trade in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, Journal of Economic 
History, Vol. 59, No. , pp. 1043-1062. 
Eaton, J. and S. Kortum (2002), Technology, Geography and Trade, 
Econometrica, Vol. 70, No.4, pp. 1741-1779. 
Egger, P.H., M. von Ehrlich, and D.R. Nelson (2011), Migration and Trade, 
CESIFO Working Paper No. 3467. Online. Available at: http://www.cesifo-
group.de/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/1200786.PDF. 
Epstein, G. and I. Gang (2006), “Ethnic networks and international trade” in F. 
Foders and R.J. Langhammer (eds.) Labor Mobility and the World Economy, Springer. 
Feenstra, R.C., R.E. Lipsey, H. Deng A.C. Ma and H. Mo (2005). World Trade 
Flows: 1962-2000, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 11040. 
Genc, M., M. Gheasi, P. Nijkamp, and J. Poot (2011), The Impact of 
Immigration on International Trade: A Meta-Analysis, IZA Discussion Paper No. 6145. 
Online. Available at: http://ftp.iza.org/dp6145.pdf.  
Ghosh, S. and S. Yamarik (2004), Does trade creation measure up? A 
reexamination of the effects of regional trading arrangements, Economics Letters, Vol. 
82, No.2, pp. 213-219. 
Girma, S. and S. Yu (2002), The Link between Immigration and Trade: 
Evidence from the U.K., Review of World Economics, Vol. 138, No.1, pp.115-130. 
Gould, D.M. (1994), Immigration Links to the Home Nation: Empirical 
Implications for US Bilateral Trade Flows, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 
76, No.2, pp. 302-316. 
Hatzigeorgiou, A. and M. Lodefalk (2011), Trade and Migration: Firm-level 
Evidence, Orebro University Swedish Business School Working Paper 06/2011. Online. 
Available at: http://www.oru.se/PageFiles/36235/WP%206%202011.pdf. 
Head, K. and T. Mayer (2000), Non-Europe: The Magnitude and Causes of 
Market Fragmentation in Europe, Weltwirtschaftliches Archive, Vol. 136, No.2 , pp. 285-
314.  
Head, K. and J. Ries (1998), Immigration and Trade Creation: Econometric 
Evidence from Canada, Canadian Journal of Economics, Vo. 31, No.1, pp. 47-62. 
Helliwell, J.F. (1997), National Borders, Trade and Migration, Pacific Economic 
Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 165-185. 
Helpman, E. and P.R. Krugman (1985) Market Structure and Foreign Trade – 
Increasing Returns, Imperfect Competition, and the International Economy, MIT Press. 
Hong, T.C. and A. Santhapparaj (2006), Skilled labor immigration and external 
trade in Malaysia: A pooled data analysis, Perspectives on Global Development and 
Technology, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 351-166. 
Hutchinson, W.K. (2002), Does Ease of Communication Increase Trade? 
Commonality of Language and Bilateral Trade, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 49, No.5, pp. 544-556. 
  
 
 
 
 
227 
 
 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2006) International Financial Statistics: 
CD-ROM, Washington, D.C., June. 
International Trade Center (ITC) (2008) Trade Statistics for International 
Business Development, Online: Available at: http://www.trademap.org/ 
Limao, N., and A.J. Venables (2001), Infrastructure, Geographical 
Disadvantage, Transport Costs and Trade, World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 15, pp. 
451–479. 
Marfouk, A. (2008), The African Brain Drain: Scope and Determinants, 
Working Papers DULBEA 08-07.RS, Université libre de Bruxelles, Department of 
Applied Economics.  
Mundra, K. (2010), Immigrant Networks and the U.S. Bilateral Trade: The Role 
of Immigrant Income, IZA Discussion Paper No. 5237. Online. Available at: 
http://ftp.iza.org/dp5237.pdf. 
Murat, M and B. Pistoresi (2009), Emigrant and Immigrant Networks in FDI, 
Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 16, No. 12, pp. 61-1264. 
Parsons, C., R. Skeldon, T. Walmsley and A. Winters (2007) Quantifying 
International Migration: A Database of Bilateral Migrant Stocks, The World Bank.  
Piperakis, A.S., C. Milner and P.W. Wright (2003), Immigration, Trade Costs 
and Trade: Gravity Evidence for Greece, Journal of Economic Integration, Vol. 18, No.4, 
pp. 750-62. 
Poot, J. and A. Strutt (2010), International Trade Agreements and International 
Migration, The World Economy, Vol. 33, No. 12, pp: 1923-1954. 
Ratha, D. and W. Shaw (2007), South-South Migration and Remittances, The 
World Bank Working Paper No.102.  
Tadesse, B. and R. White (2011), Emigrant Effects on Trade: Re-examining the 
Immigrant-trade Link from the Home Country Perspective, Eastern Economic Journal, 
Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 281–302.  
Tinbergen, J. (1962) The World Economy: Suggestions for an International 
Economic Policy, Twentieth Century Fund. 
United States Central Intelligence Agency (US CIA) (2008) CIA World 
Factbook. Online: Available at: https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ 
index.html. 
Wagner, D., K. Head and J. Ries (2002), Immigration and the Trade of 
Provinces, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 49, No.5, pp. 507-525.  
White, R. (2010), Migration and International Trade: The US Experience since 
1945. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton MA USA: Edward Elgar. 
White, R. (2008), Exploring a US Immigrant - Intra-Industry Trade Link, 
Eastern Economic Journal, Vol. 34, No.2, pp. 252-262. 
White, R. (2007a), Immigrant-Trade Links, Transplanted Home Bias and 
Network Effects, Applied Economics, Vol. 39, No.7, pp. 839-852. 
White, R. (2007b), An Examination of the Danish Immigrant-Trade Link, 
International Migration, Vol. 45, No. 5, pp. 62-86. 
White, R. and B. Tadesse (2011), International Migration and Economic 
Integration: Understanding the Immigrant-Trade Link. Cheltenham, UK and 
Northampton MA USA: Edward Elgar. 
  
 
 
 
 
228 
 
 
White, R. and B. Tadesse (2008a), Cultural Distance and the US Immigrant-
Trade Link, The World Economy, Vol. 31, No.8. pp. 1078-1096. 
White, R. and B. Tadesse (2008b), Immigrants, Cultural Distance and U.S. 
State-Level Exports of Cultural Products, The North American Journal of Economics and 
Finance, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp.331-338. 
White, R. and B. Tadesse (2007), Immigration Policy, Cultural Pluralism and 
Trade: Evidence from the White Australia Policy, Pacific Economic Review, Vol. 12, 
No. 4, pp. 489-509. 
World Bank (2006) Global Economic Prospects: Economic Implications of 
Remittances and Migration, The World Bank. 
